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Liquidity, Welfare and  
Distribution 
 
Summary: This work presents a dynamic general equilibrium model where
wealth distribution is endogenous. I provide channels of causality that suggest
a complex relationship between financial markets and the real activity which
breaks down the classical dichotomy. As a consequence, the Friedman rule 
does not hold. In terms of the current events taking place in the world econ-
omy, this paper provides a rationale to advert against the perils of an economy
satiated with liquidity. Efficiency and distribution cannot thus be considered as 
separate attributes once we account for the interactions between financial
markets and the economic performance.
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The current crisis presents evidence against the convenience of a market economy 
satiated with liquidity. The effects of the financial factors over the business cycle 
have been studied extensively in the literature. This class of models (Mark Gertler 
and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki 2010) introduces an agency problem between ownership and 
control which establishes a wedge between the external and the internal cost of fi-
nance. As a result, the balance sheet is a key determinant of the cost of credit, giving 
rise to a positive feedback between the financial and the real sector (financial accel-
erator).  
However, this body of the literature omits an explicit role for liquidity, which 
seems to be a cause of the financial turmoil. Milton Friedman (1969) argued heuristi-
cally that an economy cannot be efficient unless agents do not economize on money 
balances. Consequently, the monetary authorities should deflate prices at a fixed rate 
so the nominal interest rate reaches as low as possible. Friedman’s article prompted 
an immediate reaction by some economists. Miguel Sidrauski (1967), William A. 
Brock (1974; 1975) and Truman Bewley (1977; 1980) among others, confirmed the 
optimality of the Friedman rule (FR). By contrast, under the assumption of alterna-
tive distortionary taxes, Edmund S. Phelps (1973) concluded that in a Ramsey equi-
librium, the optimal inflation tax is positive and equals the deadweight loss of alter-
native taxes. Robert Lucas and Nancy Stokey (1983), Kent P. Krimbourgh (1986), 
Chari V. Varadarajan, Christiano J. Lavrence, and Patrick J. Kehoe (1991), Pablo 
Guidotti and Carlos A. Veigh (1993), suggested that the presence of distortionary 
taxes does not imply a positive optimal inflation tax. 
In this article I show that the FR is suboptimal in a stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium model in an environment isomorphic to Friedman’s (1969). Households 
are assumed to face idiosyncratic income shocks which can be partially buffered by 
holding capital and inconvertible money. Incomplete market models with idiosyn- 
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cratic risk were first introduced by Bewley (1977; 1980; 1983) to formalize classical 
issues such as the permanent income hypothesis and the FR itself, as noted above. In 
the same spirit, Rao S. Aiyagari (1994), Mark Huggett (1997) and Tiago V. de V. 
Cavalcanti and Anne P. Villamil (2003) addressed the capital accumulation patterns 
and the determination of the interest rate under the presence of idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty and showed the existence of a precautionary motive of savings. Per Krussell 
and Anthony A. Smith (1998) showed that in a Bewley economy the aggregate dy-
namics are mostly explained by the first moment of wealth distribution. In contrast, 
this article provides an example where idiosyncratic uncertainty matters substantially 
in terms of policy implications. This paper provides a rationale to avert from the per-
ils of an economy satiated with liquidity. Efficiency and distribution cannot thus be 
considered as epistemically separable attributes once we account for the interactions 
between financial markets and the economic performance. Ayse İmrohoroğlu (1992) 
and Andrés Erosa and Gustavo Ventura (2002) have studied the distributional impact 
of inflation to criticize the optimality of the FR. However, the analysis of these arti-
cles is limited to the study of stationary equilibria: in the standard Cass-Koopmans 
one sector-growth model, the golden rule is not a valid criterion for utility maximiza-
tion. Consequently, the transition path turns out to be a relevant factor as far as wel-
fare is concerned.  
Market incompleteness has been proven to be a key issue to determine the op-
timum quantity of money. In Timothy Kehoe, David Levine, and Michael Woodford 
(1992), the distribution of real balances is degenerate. They set up a stochastic dy-
namic general equilibrium model where the government issues nominal non-state 
contingency liabilities. For this reason, price volatility has the potential to absorb 
unexpected movements in fiscal expenditures. As Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and 
Martín Uribe (2004) have shown, a small degree of price stickiness under imperfect 
competition induces a deviation of the FR. Aubhik Khan, Robert G. King, and Alex-
ander L. Wolman (2003) and Nicola Acocella, Giovanni di Bartolomeo, and Alexan-
der L. Wolman (2011) reach similar conclusions. Inflation plays the role of an indi-
rect tax on profits whenever the government cannot undo market distortion through 
fiscal instruments.  
Other examples where an expansionary monetary policy dominates the FR are 
provided by Edward Green and Ruilin Zhou (2002), Perry Mehrling (1995), Beatrix 
Paal and Bruce D. Smith (2000), Alexei Deviatov and Neil Wallace (2001) and 
Smith (2002). İmrohoroğlu (1992) computed the inflation cost in a pure monetary 
economy similar to the model herein presented. She found that the welfare costs of 
inflation are higher than those reported by Martin Bailey (1956). The analysis of this 
paper differs from İmrohoroğlu (1992) and Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992) in 
that the minimal amount of income is here very small, a fact that exacerbates the dis-
tributional issues. 
In the next two sections I offer the description of the environment. I point to 
distribution as a more remote variable to consider than market incompleteness, im-
perfect competition and sluggish price adjustment, to configure the optimal monetary 
policy. Section 3 defines the competitive equilibrium, Section 4 presents the main 
results and Section 5 concludes. An appendix provides the proof of Proposition 1.  
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1. The Model 
 
The economy is populated with households, competitive firms producing a homoge-
neous commodity and a monetary authority holding the monopoly right to issue 
money. Each period, consumers suffer an idiosyncratic income shock which origi-
nates an endogenous dynamic of wealth distribution. Since this is the only source of 
uncertainty, the aggregates evolve deterministically under perfect foresight (Kenneth 
L. Judd 1985). There is no market for borrowing and lending, in line with Bewley 
(1980), Aiyagari (1994) and many others. 
In Guillermo Calvo and Pablo Guidotti (1993) and Chari, Lavrence, and 
Kehoe (1991) it is (Ramsey) optimal to use unanticipated inflation tax in a stochastic 
environment with distortionary taxes and nominal public debt. Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2004) have shown that under slight price rigidities and imperfect competition 
it is optimal to promote price stability. Since our model is a reduced form of a more 
complex set of relations, I will assume that money is issued by the government at a 
fixed rate 
    
  = (1+ )  
 ,’ 
 
    
   stands for nominal supply of money. If   is positive (negative), money is in-
jected (withdrawn) from the public. Money is held because of their transaction ser-
vices (liquidity), captured in the utility function as we shall see later. 
The only final, non storable good,  , is produced according to a neoclassical 
production function given shared by a set of firms operating in a perfectly competi-
tive market. Aggregate output is therefore a function of aggregate capital ( ) and 
total labour ( ) 
 =  ( , ) −   ,  
 
where   is the depreciation rate. Since the total labor is normalized to one, the output 
can be expressed in terms of the aggregate capital  : 
 
 ( ) =  ( ,1) −   .  
 
The function f satisfies the usual Inada conditions. The optimality conditions are 
 
 = ′( ) 
 = ( ) −  ′( ) . 
(1.1).
 
2. Consumers 
 
2.1  Preferences and Transaction Technology 
 
There is a continuum of households that share identical preferences defined over a 
stochastic process of consumption and real balances, 
 
(1− )    
∞
   
[ (  ) +  (  )],  (2.1)
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with 0 <   < 1 being the rate of preference. Individual real balances are denoted by 
 . E is the expectation operator and let us assume that expectations are formed ra-
tionally. Utility functions ( , ) obey the Inada conditions. Robert C. Feenstra 
(1986) argued that models with money in the utility function are isomorphic to 
economies with a transactions technology. I assume that   has a finite asymptotic 
exponent (greater than 1). The exponential utility function fails to hold this property. 
On the contrary, our assumption rules out the possibility that the difference between 
the marginal utilities of two close values of c differ greatly. I also assume that   
dominates asymptotically to   which implies that the fraction of wealth held in liquid 
assets decreases with wealth (Erosa and Ventura 2002). These two assumptions can 
be written in the following way: 
 
1<l i m
 →∞
−
    ′( )
    
< ∞   H1
 
lim
 →∞
 ′( )
 ′( )
=0 .   H2
 
When   and   belong to the class of CRRA utility function, the assumption 
H2 implies that the coefficient of risk aversion of   is greater than that of  . The as-
sumption that the coefficient of risk aversion is greater than one is necessary to ob-
tain Proposition 1, but it is seemingly in line with the empirical evidence. 
 
2.2 The Budget Constraint 
 
Let    be the price level. Let us define: 
     =
    
  
. 
  
Therefore, we have: 
  
  
=
  
    
    
  
= (1+   )    . 
 
This is the stock of money held by a household multiplied by its gross return. Note 
that the real return of money is inversely related with the rate of inflation and con-
verges to −   as the time scale tends to zero (continuous time). Likewise, the re-
sources available for consumption at time t from capital assets are given by (1 +
  )  . Labor supply is inelastic, but productivity is idiosyncratic and follows a stable 
Markov process. It is further assumed that efficiency labor is distributed according to 
the measure   . The distribution    stochastically dominates (first-order)   ′ if 
 >  ′. With no loss of generality we can assume that all    share identical support 
Θ =[   ,  ]. Let us define the probability space (Ω,ℱ,P), where any element of Ω is a 
history {  }, ℱ is the infinite product of Borel fields of Θ; and P is the probability 
measure naturally inferred from   . For the technical details, see Ionescu-Tulcea 
(1949). At the aggregate level, I assume for convenience that the distribution of   ( )  
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rests at a stationary state. This means that the following condition holds, for any 
measurable set A in Θ: 
 ( ) =      (  ).
 
 
 
Moreover, the total labor supply is normalized to 1, so that 
 
∫    = 1. 
 
The consumers’ intertemporal budget constraint, expressed in real terms, is given by: 
 
   +      +      = (1+   )     + (1+   )   +      +   .  (2.2)
 
Total resources (wealth plus income), expressed in real terms, are equal to the 
right-hand side of (2.2) and are denoted by   , with x₀ > 0 given. The government 
distributes uniformly the inflation tax as lump-sum subsidies (if σ > 0) or transfers 
(otherwise). Accordingly, 
 
   =
   
 
  
.  (2.3)
 
The Markovian property guarantees that an individual state at period t is fully 
described by    =(    ,   ). In Samuel Gil Martín (2011) I show that the economy is 
globally stable. Therefore, in the sequel I will consider stationary states, character-
ized by a constant return   = ((1+ )⁻¹,1+ ). . The wage rate can be dropped as it 
is determined by  . The time index can be conveniently dropped. 
 
2.3 A Recursive Formulation 
 
The consumer problem expressed in (2.1) and (2.2) are conveniently represented in a 
recursive formulation. Let    = ( , ) and let 
 
   = {((1+ )  ,1+ ):(1+  )   ≤     ≤  1 +  }. 
 
The set of admissible z is in the interior of Z (intZ). First, it is convenient to 
define utility in terms of the variables of state and control (s and a): let  ( , ) =
  (  −  ⁺) +   ( ), where  ⁺  =     +   .  Denoting the forward operator by ', 
wealth evolves according to 
 
 ′ = ⋅ +   +  .  
 
The Bellman equation can be written in the following way for    = ( , ): 
 
 ( , ) = max
   
{ ( , )+ ∫ ( ⋅ +  + , , )   (  )}  (2.4)
 
As proven in Lerma O. Hernández and Jean-Bernard Lasserre (1996), there is 
a unique value function   satisfying (2.4). The optimal decision rules are unique and 
continuous. The value function v is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continu-
ously differentiable in  . From the maximum theorem,   varies continuously with    
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and z. The functions  ( , ), ( , ), with    = ( , ), are the optimal decision rules. 
The individual wealth, once the optimal rule is applied,  ′ ≝   ′, evolves according 
to: 
 
  ′ =  (   ,  )⋅ +   +  .   (2.5)
 
As pointed out by Bewley (1983), there are negative inflation rates that can 
fail to be implementable. In such a case, a positive mass of consumers would be un-
able to pay the tax necessary to implement the policy. To understand this point it is 
convenient to define the difference between money balances with respect to the ag-
gregate level, 
   =    −
  
 
  
, 
 
and rewrite the budget constraint (2.2) in terms of   , 
 
   +      +      = (1+   )     + (1+   )   +      ≡     
     =    − (1+  )
  
 
  
. 
(2.2’)
 
Here I assume that the sequence of gross returns, 
 
   =  (1+   )  ,(1+   ) , 
 
converges within the int . Therefore, the implementability of a deflation rate guaran-
tees the existence of a plan (    
  ,     
  ) such that, 
 
     +       
  
 
   
≥ 
  
1+   
  
 
   
  
   +   
  (    
  +     
  ).  (2.6)
 
where Rt is the discount factor ∏ (1+   )  
     and  , the nominal interest rate. Equa-
tion (2.6) indicates that the present value of the future stream of sure income up to t 
plus the initial wealth must be greater than the present value of the costs of holding 
money. A deflation rate    < 0, is said to be implementable when (2.6) is satisfied by 
all consumers (a.s) at    =  0. In a stationary equilibrium, the wage can be written as 
   because it can be inferred from r. Implementability then boils down to 
 
   ≥
1+ 
 
   .  (2.7)
 
The right hand side of (2.7) the present value of the guaranteed labor income is the 
natural debt limit because the ratio   (1+  )   is the interest rate paid by money. 
Keeping this level of real balances avoids the risk of default.  
Bewley (1980, 1983) assumed that marginal utility is finite for any level of 
consumption. Our assumption of infinite marginal utility of zero consumption tends 
to zero guarantees that any inflation rate close enough to the discount rate (FR) is 
implementable whenever households have enough wealth to pay for the inflation tax. 
When households do not hoard enough assets to pay the tax, they risk zero consump-
tion in finite time with positive probability if they suffer a run of adverse shocks,  
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which can never be an optimal strategy. Conversely, there is always an implement-
able negative inflation tax when initial wealth is strictly positive (for a positive mass 
of consumers). Once the economy is near the stationary equilibrium, it is positive to 
reduce further the inflation tax because households must accumulate more assets to 
pay for future taxes. This means that households will increasingly hoard assets to pay 
future taxes (so avoiding the risk of consuming zero in finite time) as deflation in-
creases. By this means, the FR becomes implementable even though it may take long 
to reach such a rule.    
 
3. Equilibrium 
 
The Euler Equations of (2.4) in steady state are: 
 
 ′(  ) ≥         ′(  )+   ′(    )     
 ′(  ) ≥  ( 1+  )   ′(    )    
(3.1)
 
Conditions (3.1) hold with equality when (2.7) is not binding and      >0 , respec-
tively. When    > 0, equation (3.1) always holds with equality because there is no 
risk of default. 
The properties of the optimal plans are commensurate to the regularity condi-
tions of the fundamentals. The optimal plan varies continuously with  : both con-
sumption and assets increase with   and they are normal. Both the ratio of money to 
capital and the ratio of money to consumption decrease with wealth. This implies that 
inflation is a regressive tax. 
When any rate of return greater than or equal the rate of discount, consumer 
resources would infinitely diverge. (See Jack Schechtman and Vera L. S. Escudero 
(1977) and Marilda A. de Oliveira Sotomayor (1984)). I focus on policy rules such 
that 1+ > . 
A Stationary Perfect-Foresight Equilibrium is defined as a set of optimal 
rules, value functions and a price system (  ,   ,   ) together with a distribution    
of states  =(   ,  ) , such that (1) consumers (3.1) and firms (2.1) are rational, (2) 
markets clear, (3) government budget is balanced and (4) the    follows an ergodic 
process consistent with (2.5). 
Existence is proven geometrically. There may be several equilibria since the 
supply of loanable funds (Figure 1) is not necessarily monotonic, as argued in Aiya-
gari (1994). This is so because a raise in the interest rate, despite having a positive 
income effect, bids down wages. Uniqueness is guaranteed in a vicinity of    because 
the capital supply becomes infinitely elastic (Figure 1). The initial condition x, to-
gether with   ,will determine the optimal decision plans, which in turn uniquely de-
termine the asset returns   . 
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Source: Aiyagari (1994). 
 
Figure 1  Market of Loanable Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gil Martín (2005). 
 
Figure 2  Market of Money 
 
A monetary equilibrium is defined formally by    = (  ,   ,   ). Figures 1 and 2 
show the existence of a stationary equilibrium. In terms of welfare, the transition 
path matters (David Cass 1965). For this reason, we are also interested in defining 
the non-stationary equilibrium parameterized by an initial distribution of states  . 
 
  
  =    
 ,   
 ,   
   , 
 
consisting of sequences converging to a stationary equilibrium   . In the case of    
 , 
the convergence is weak. 
 
Remark: 
 
  When    =1  (representative agent), the model is that of Sidrauski (1967). 
It is easy to prove that the FR is optimal.  
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  When  =0 ,  the model is that of Aiyagari (1994). The stationary equilib-
rium is represented geometrically by means of the Figure 2. 
 
4. Welfare, Capital Accumulation and Optimal Policy 
 
In a non stationary state, the sequence of optimal plans, resources and welfare can be 
written as a random variable defined in the product probability space 
 
(   × Ω,ℬ(  ) ×ℱ,  ⨂    ). 
 
The  − fields (information sets) ℬ(  ) ×ℱ   =ℬ (  ) ×ℬ(Θ)  make up a filtra-
tion. ℱ  is the   -field generated by the histories     ≤   and the initial condition  . 
Ex-ante  expected  welfare is a random variable defined in this probability 
space: 
 
   
  = (1− )         ,  +       ,       .
∞
   
  (4.1)
 
The Ramsey problem 
max    
 :1+ ≥  , 
 
has a solution, not necessarily unique. The main difficulty is that, in general, the op-
timal policy depends on the initial distribution. The first result (Proposition 1)
1 shows 
that (4.1) increases in    within a neighborhood of   −1  (FR). 
Proposition 1 If    is close enough to the FR, the function    
  (4.1) is strictly 
increasing in    provided that   is small enough and regardless of the initial condi-
tion  . 
A straightforward corollary drawn from the Proposition is that the result on 
optimality is robust under alternative welfare criteria whose weights are non decreas-
ing in (x, ). The crucial factor that determines the optimal monetary policy is the 
distribution of the efficiency units of labor (uncertainty). Since the FR fails to smooth 
the consumption paths, this analysis suggests that the welfare benefits of an expan-
sionary policy are of considerable magnitude. 
Note that a change in    brings about distributive effects. There is a massive 
accumulation of money balances to avoid a risk of default. This money is indeed idle 
money which does not enter the circuit of current production. Therefore, in the long-
run
2 the FR brings about a situation which can well be defined as a liquidity trap. 
The proof of Proposition 1 rests upon assumptions H1 and H2 (Section 2). They state 
that the welfare gains of real balances are of second order compared to the welfare 
gains achieved from consumption. Letting aside the distributional channel, welfare 
might be increased by bidding up inflation. Low inflation fosters capital accumula-
tion because inflation is negatively correlated with money return. This phenomenon, 
known as the Tobin effect, is reversed once inflation reaches a threshold level (pre-
cautionary effect). Thus, as inflation decreases so that it reaches a value close to the 
                                                        
1 A similar result with iid shocks has been proven in Gil Martín (2010). 
2 Indeed, near the FR the stationary state takes longer to reach the steady state.  
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FR, the portfolio-substitution effect dominates the precautionary effect (liquidity 
trap) and aggregate consumption and capital grow with the rate of injection of liquid 
balances. 
Proposition 2. When    is close enough to the FR, aggregate capital, output 
and consumption increase in     There exists a critical level  ∗ such that when 
   >  ∗ aggregate capital, output and consumption decrease in   .  
A formal proof can be found in Gil Martín (2005). The insight is that when in-
flation grows, the substitution effect becomes less and less important. The specula-
tive motives to hold money are less important as the nominal interest rate grows far 
beyond zero and money is held for transaction and precautionary purposes. 
 
5. Conclusion: Policy Recommendations 
 
Since 2000, the Fed and the European Central Bank have reduced the interest rate for 
a number of reasons (Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff 2009). There is sparse 
evidence of increasing wealth polarization after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreements in the first half of the 1970s. This process is multidimensional and oper-
ates at different scales – countries, firms, households, sectors – and crucially depends 
on different aspects of the financial market. In my opinion, the policy adopted by the 
Fed and the ECB may have worsened the polarization process. This point of view 
agrees with the Keynesian perspective on uncertainty: when the nominal interest rate 
is close to zero, amid a process of intense financial innovation, it is reasonable to 
assume that uncertainty is endogenously determined as a result of an increasing (and 
most of the time invisible) interconnection through the inflating balance sheets of 
different economic units. In this model, the accumulation of liquid assets under the 
FR is a reaction against the risk of default (with severe effects on welfare). These 
balance sheet effects have been analyzed formally in the financial accelerator litera-
ture (Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010) to highlight how the complex relations between the 
economic system and the financial markets give rise to what may potentially become 
perverse feedbacks effects as those observed in recent events. 
Another strand of the literature, based on nominal and real rigidities, suggests 
that the optimal inflation rate, though different from the FR, is close to zero. In prac-
tical terms, this is no real criticism of the FR since Friedman himself never thought to 
apply a deflationary rule in a real scenario. This constitutes a further example that 
supports the idea that new Keynesian economics has embedded much of monetarist 
thought (Brian Snowdon and Howard R. Vane 2005). Returning to our model, as the 
FR may be associated to high uncertainty, it is reasonable to assume that an optimal 
monetary policy is inflationary. A further reason to think that the optimal inflation 
rate is strictly positive is the possibility of flat tails. If they have been observed in 
financial series, this evidence suggests that individual uncertainty also displays flat 
tails and long memory. In this sense, distribution gives a powerful explanatory vari-
able which might be in part responsible for the importance of market rigidities and 
asymmetric information in terms of policy recommendations. 
The financial accelerator combined with the distributional channels of mone-
tary policy put forward here are likely to create a feedback loop especially if the FR, 
as suggested by Keynes and illustrated in the model developed in this article, can  
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aggravate the problems derived from increasing uncertainty. The contraction of in-
vestment, on the one hand, can have an adverse effect on the balance sheet of differ-
ent economic units. On the other hand, the financial accelerator could have a multi-
plicative effect on the reaction of aggregate capital to secular inflation. The interac-
tions between the different parts of the economic system make any effort of calibra-
tion spurious.  
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Appendix 
 
The optimal decision rule    converges pointwise to   . Let the family of functions 
be defined recursively as follows: 
 
    
  ( , ) =     ( , ) ⋅   +       +     .  (A.1)
 
These functions define a one-to-one mapping between x and  . In symbols, 
    
  ( ′) =   if and only if     
  ( ) =  ′. By ergodicity,     
  →   (independent of 
the initial state x). The following equality holds: 
 
        =     ∘      , 
 
where   is a measure depending on the preferences and of   , defined on the proba-
bility space (Θ,B(Θ)). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Our claim is to show the existence of a suffciently small real number   such that the 
expected welfare is increasing in the interval ( ,  +  ). The proof proceeds in sev-
eral steps. The proposition builds upon the ergodicity property of the distribution of 
wealth   , which is proven upon a standard fixed point argument (See Gil Martín, 
2010). Firstly, we make use of two facts: (1) as 1+ → , individual consumption 
differs from labor income by an arbitrarily small amount; and, (2) as shown in Cass 
(1965), the golden rule level of consumption is strictly greater than Pareto optimal 
allocation. Let    be the average capital when  =1   ( a l m o s t   s u r e l y ) . Then, 
 
lim
 →   
         =   . 
 
It follows that there exists a number   such that for 1+ ∈(  , + ) , the 
average capital is increasing in  . Besides, since the golden rule level of consump-
tion is strictly less than the one attained by   , there should be another real number 
 ′ for which consumption increases in capital, and thereby in  . In the sequel, let 
 =m i n (   ,  ′). In order to simplify notation, let   :Θ →   be the limiting random 
variable of a generic equilibrium variable for an arbitrary  ∈(   , +  ) . That is, 
   =    ∘    . Let    be defined likewise for a level of inflation  +  .    Since, as 
pointed out earlier, average consumption increases in  , we can write the following 
inequality: 
       <      . 
 
For convenience we shall the use either the subindex 0 or   to denote whatever 
variable in equilibrium correspond to the correlative  . By Euler equation (4.1), and 
using the (strict) concavity of the utility function, 
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 (  ) − (  ) >  (1+   )(   −   )    ′(  )  .  (A.2)
 
We are now interested in showing that the gains of utility in terms of con-
sumption, as measured by  , dominate the deadweight losses of real balances. Ana-
lytically, 
 
 ( (  )− (    ))    >  ( (  )− (    ))     
 
By monotonicity of the consumption plan, the random variable has a finite 
range. Aggregate capital as well as the wage rate are increasing around the inflation 
rate. Therefore, 
 
 ( (  )− (    ))    >   ′(  )(   −   )   ≥   ′(  )   (   −   )  .  (A.3)
 
Now, since     is strictly concave, 
 
 (  ) −  (  ) >  ′(  )(   −   ). 
 
Let us define 
 =
(1+   )(1+ ) −1
 ((1+   ))
, 
 
 =   ′(  ) −     ′(  ). 
 
From the Euler equations, 
 
 (  ) −  (  ) < (   ′(  ) +  )(   −   ). 
 
For any pair random variables X and Y for which | −    | ≤  ,      ≤
     −  sup| −    |. Setting 
  
   =s u p    ′(  ) −   ′(  )   , 
for    =   , , and applying this inequality to the last expression, we obtain: 
 
   (  ) − (  )    
<   (   −   )     ′(  )   +        |   −   |
+    (  ) −  (  )    . 
(A.4)
 
The last two summands of the last equation are negligible (Gil Martín 2010). 
Let   and     be the average welfare levels corresponding, respectively, to the infla-
tion rates   and  +  . Rearranging A.3 and A.4, the necessary condition for 
    >    is: 
 (   −   )   >   (   −   )  . 
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It amounts to showing that ( =   ) 
 
lim
 → 
      =0 .  
 
This property is a straightforward consequence of the following facts: 
 
lim
 → 
    ∫     = ∞; 
 
and (from the Euler equation and the asymptotical exponential property of the utility 
function): 
lim
 → 
( ′(  )   −    ′(  )) =0 .  
 
The second part of the proposition accounts for the transition. The second 
part of the proposition accounts for the transition. Assume an initial condition 
 =      (FR). We need to prove that    
  is locally increasing in  . That is, starting 
from a steady state around the FR, raising the inflation rate brings about an expected 
welfare gain. From Jensen’s inequality, for any  , 
 
 ′(  ) >  ′           . 
 
This implies that 
   <         . 
 
And applying the iterated rule of conditional expectations, we see that the path of 
consumption increases monotonically to the steady state: 
 
         ≤           . 
 
However this decrease in consumption, ex-ante (at time zero, immediately after im-
plementing the new rule) one-period ahead instantaneous utility increases, due to a 
redistribution of wealth which provokes a gain in terms of utility that overwhelms the 
losses. Let write the path of consumption   
  as a function of the history {  }   
  . Let 
ℎ:Θ → Θ be defined in such a way that ℎ( ) =  ′ if and only if: 
 
    
 ( , )  (  ) =       ∘   
  ( ′) . 
 
Since the divergence of    ∘   
   from the identity diverges (in the supre-
mum norm) by an arbitrary small number, the mapping ℎ (which depends on  ) has a 
unique fixed point    ∈i n t Θ for the same reasons pointed out in the first part of the 
proof. By continuity and monotonicity, this fixed point is unique. Any    ∈    ≝
  ,     satisfies: 
    
 ( , )  (  ) >       ∘   
  ( ) . 
 
A similar argument leads to the existence of a family of non empty measur-
able sets    such that, for any    ∈   , ( ( ) =    ⊗⋯⊗   ),   
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 ( , ) ( )(  ) >
Θ 
      ∘   
  ( ) . 
 
The set  ≝ ∩    is non empty because, as the capital is an increasing se-
quence, so it is the sequence of the wages. Hence, there exists an attainable plan of 
consumption consisting of holding an amount of money holdings equaling the aver-
age    =  0, and consuming the labor income. This plan gives a period by period util-
ity strictly greater than the one achieved by the optimal plan under the FR. The prop-
osition is concluded once we show that 
 
lim
 →∞
  (   
 )      ( ) >        ∘   
  ( ) .  (A.5)
 
From the fundamental theorem of calculus, 
 
∫   
 ( , ) ( )(  ) − Θ        ∘   
  ( ) =∫ ∫  ′( )  
  
 ( , )
  ∘  
  ( )   ( )(  ). 
 
Define the measurable mapping from B  to its complement  ℓ: →  , 
which is mean-preserving as of period 1:  
 
    
   ( )
 ×Θ
=     
   ( )
ℓ( )×Θ
. 
 
Since marginal utility is a decreasing function, 
 
      ′( )  
  
 ( , )
  ( )
    
   (  ) >       ′( )  
  
 ( , )
  ( )
 
ℓ( )
  (  ); 
 
and 
 
          
 ( , ′) −       ∘   
  ( )    ( )
 ×Θ
>          
 ( , ′) −       ∘   
  ( )    ( )
ℓ( )×Θ
. 
 
Last, we shall argue that agents’ long-run utility belonging in the set 
   ∪ ℓ( ) increases, despite reducing their consumption at time 0. The reason is that 
the previous plan continues to be optimal, since we chose to be close enough to as to 
make the discrepancy of money holdings with respect to the average negligible. 
From Theorem 2 in Huggett (1997), the capital stock is increasing. As the initial 
condition allows households to maintain   up to average, and capital (and wage) 
grows with  , 
 
  
  ≥    
  >     
 
Since    differs from    by an arbitrary small amount independent of  , (A.5) 
must hold. The proposition is concluded. 